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ABSTRACT: This article introduces a “team-of-teams” approach
for countering Russian information operations such as those
associated with democratic processes.

I

n early 2018, the Justice Department Special Counsel indicted
13 individuals and several companies associated with the St.
Petersburg-based Internet Research Agency LLC. The parties
allegedly interfered in US political processes as part of a Russian scheme
to create chaos, inflame emotions, and polarize a divided public.1 The
effort also sought to discredit Hillary Clinton, whom President Vladimir
Putin expected to win the Oval Office.2
The Special Counsel charged the accused with stealing identities,
using PayPal to transfer money and to purchase Facebook ads, and
falsely claiming to be US activists who contacted Donald Trump’s
campaign. The United States also said the accused made illegal campaign
expenditures, failed to register as foreign agents, used false statements to
obtain visas, and committed wire fraud. The most notable accusations
involved organizing phony rallies, mounting a massive social media
campaign to influence behavior, and paying Americans to carry out
their objectives. It bears noting that many Western commentators
presume that Putin directed this action. In our system, however, guilt
must be proven beyond a reasonable doubt. Likewise, George Beebe,
the respected former head of the Central Intelligence Agency’s Russia
analysis, stated the Internet Research Agency may have conducted this
activity independently, without Putin’s involvement.3
The Kremlin’s strategy is to spread chaos for strategic effect, in
order, as Peter B. Doran and Donald N. Jensen declared, “to confuse,
distract, and disrupt.” 4 Three premises underlie this strategy. First,
an authoritarian regime can conduct cohesive information warfare or
cyber warfare. Second, the regime can cope better with chaos, and thus
advance its agenda. Third, weakening other nations strengthens the
regime’s power at home. While the United States views national security
as protecting the nation, Putin sees it as ensuring his political survival.
Stopping Russian meddling requires an approach capable of
developing strategic appreciation, forging and implementing a strategy,
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and anticipating effects and consequences. First, the best mechanism to
forge and implement strategy must be established. The “team-of-teams”
concept that General Stanley McChrystal used in Iraq seems optimal,
especially when the team is fully empowered to act through the National
Security Council. Since national security is at stake, military leadership
with bipartisan congressional oversight seems ideal for building trust
and credibility. Once established, the United States should employ
active defense to discredit and to delegitimize Russian actions. America
then should engage in a strategic offense to “extract a cost from Putin that
outweighs the benefits” and to persuade him to shift his efforts from US
politics to shoring up his own.5
Russian experts interviewed for this commentary emphasized the
importance of framing any national security plan in the context of the
Kremlin, not Russia or Putin.6 Given Putin’s unpredictable, distrustful
nature, attacking him personally could escalate matters. Characterizing
Russia’s actions as Kremlin activity makes the point with fewer downsides.

Team of Teams

A team-of-teams approach can leverage the unique resources and
authorities commanded by the US presidency to forge and implement
strategy. The public spokesperson for such a team should be a military
professional such as Admiral Michael S. Rogers, the commander of US
Cyber Command and director of National Security, or General Joseph
Dunford, chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.7 The team should include
nonpartisan and bipartisan national security experts with extensive
knowledge of the political aspects of the team’s efforts.
Such a diverse team would communicate collaboration and integrity
to audiences who need to believe our nation’s leaders are speaking the
truth in today’s polarized political environment. This combined effort
would also balance the political polarity, often magnified by mass media,
to seize and to maintain the critical moral high ground invaluable to
information warfare. Audience trust is critical to enabling the government
to articulate a credible rationale that explains what it is doing, why it is
taking an action, and how the action will affect target audiences.
The team of teams is a proven concept. McChrystal employed a
sophisticated one to fight al-Qaeda, and US political campaigns employ
a simpler one. President Ronald Reagan applied the concept to counter
Soviet active measures and to win public support for deployment of
intermediate nuclear weapons in Europe. Ambassador Brian E. Carlson
explains, “The cardinal principle of a team-of-teams approach recognizes
that strategic leadership must flow from the White House.” 8
5      Dell L. Daily (retired lieutenant general, US Army; retired ambassador; former coordinator for
counterterrorism for the Department of State), interview by author, March 13, 2018 (emphasis added).
6      Experts included Donald N. Jensen, chief of information warfare for the Center for European
Policy Analysis and former diplomat who served in Moscow; George Beebe, former director of
the Central Intelligence Agency’s Russia analysis; King Mallory, senior researcher at the RAND
Corporation; Jeffrey Starr, former deputy assistant Secretary of Defense for Russia, Ukraine, and
Eurasia; and others.
7      This idea emerged in discussions with Colonel Jeremiah R. Monk (US Air Force, and deputy
director, NATO Centre of Excellence Defense against Terrorism in Ankara, Turkey).
8      Brian E. Carlson (former ambassador and former chief liaison with the Department of
Defense on strategic communication and public diplomacy for the State Department), interview by
author, February 13, 2018.
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The cooperative nature of a team of teams counters the tendency of
a bureaucracy to strangle planning and action.9 A Harvard Business Review
survey of 7,000 readers recently found bureaucracy creates bloat, friction,
insularity, disempowerment, risk aversion, inertia, and politicking.
Bureaucracy also devours time on preparing reports, complying with
internal requests, and burying employees beneath multiple management
layers.10 A team of teams can avoid such inefficiencies.
McChrystal’s business partner, Chris Fussell, observes that
Putin understands how to exploit information-age threats: “Putin
leverages many of the same factors that allowed al-Qaeda to become
an exceptionally destabilizing force.” 11 Fussell notes Russia employs
diverse strategies, operations, and tactics in carrying out its propaganda
activities. No single solution or entity, can defeat either. A wide range of
parties, many working as small teams, is required.
Fussell states, “Small teams do their best work when they
communicate faster and more effectively than the problems they
face.” The challenge is to scale that approach to the enterprise level.
In Iraq, “thousands of personnel, from a wide range of organizations,
resynchronized on a very aggressive cadence in order to move faster than
al-Qaeda, which could rewrite the rules as they saw fit on any given day.”
Although al-Qaeda moved quickly, McChrystal’s team moved faster, a
pivotal capability that allowed the general to tailor his approach to Iraq.
Fussell also notes that the communication structure moved quickly:
Resynchronizing for 90 minutes every 24 hours. . . . the sessions would
include thousands of participants around the globe. More important
than the cadence or methodology of these forums was the end state they
aimed to achieve. The intent of each session was to reestablish a shared
consciousness between those involved, that is, a common understanding of
what the problem looked like in the moment, and what new intelligence was
most critical to the next phase of decision-making.12

A team of teams can involve fewer participants than the thousands
McChrystal engaged against al-Qaeda. The approach is what matters. A
team of teams could help identify Moscow’s real-time stories, narratives,
themes, and messages, recognizing the active channels, voices, and key
influencers. The team could facilitate integrated, cohesive, and coherent
messaging and countermessaging strategies. With this information,
the collaborative organization would be able to maintain situational
awareness to support effective operations and tactics. Team members
could quickly coordinate resources across the military, government
agencies, domestic organizations, and partner nations.
The team’s activities would include identifying media outlets or
social media sites associated with Russian intelligence; conducting
target audience analysis; and holding accountable journalists who
9      Stanley A. McChrystal, Team of Teams: New Rules of Engagement for a Complex World (New
York: Portfolio, 2015); Chris Fussell, One Mission: How Leaders Build a Team of Teams with C. W.
Goodyear (New York: Portfolio, 2017); and Stanley A. McChrystal, My Share of the Task (New York:
Portfolio, 2013).
10      Gary Hamel and Michele Zanini, “What We Learned about Bureaucracy from 7,000 HBR
Readers,” Harvard Business Review, August 10, 2017; and Gary Hamel, “Why Bureaucracy Must Die,”
Fortune, March 26, 2014.
11      Chris Fussell (managing partner and chief growth officer at McChrystal Group), interview
by author, September 29, 2017.
12      Fussell, interview.
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sell their services to Russian news channels. This information would
support Justice Department action to force such parties to register under
the Foreign Agents Registration Act. In this manner, a team of teams
can integrate all elements of national power, including the military,
counterintelligence, the intelligence community, the State Department,
and the Justice Department.
The military’s experience in employing the team-of-teams
approach in contemporary situations makes it suitable for organizing
and administering the team. Military expertise in cyber and electronic
warfare techniques will also prove vital to detecting Russian internet
channels and mitigating their impact on American interests. Assessing
options for leveraging pressure points such as Ukraine also requires an
appreciation for military strategy.

Interagency Cohesion

No single US government department or agency would prove as
effective as a team of teams. None possesses the required authorities,
resources, or political influence.
Department of State. The mission of the Department of State’s Global
Engagement Center was broadened in 2017 to fight “foreign propaganda
and disinformation” directed against US national security interests and
“proactively promote fact-based narratives” that support United States
allies and interests.13 The center’s last permanent chief, Michael D.
Lumpkin, earned praise and the current staff is smart and hard-working.
Former Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Russia, Ukraine
and Central Asia, Jeffrey Star, summarizes one inherent challenge the
institution faces: “No single department or agency possesses the clout,
expertise, or resources to make things happen across the US government
on the scale needed to counter Russian disinformation.” 14 The center’s
authority and flexibility to sole-source contracts for required subject
matter expertise, an essential requirement for forging and executing
fast-moving campaign strategy, is unclear. Some State Department
officials indicate proposals submitted to the Global Engagement Center
may take as much as a year to process. Putting it mildly, this timeframe
is too long.15
Department of Defense. The Defense Department brings unique
strategic and organizational expertise that a team of teams requires.
But countering the Kremlin’s information warfare demands a strong
national strategy led by the president. In this conflict paradigm,
information warfare, not kinetic operations, will prove decisive. The
military’s resources and leadership are best deployed in this type of
engagement through a team of teams.16 The Defense Department’s
role, which includes employing cybertools and addressing escalatory
issues, is broad. Our military possesses unique capabilities to conduct
essential human factors analysis essential to pressuring key actors who
13      National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2017, Pub. L. No. 114-328, 130 Stat.
2001 (2016).
14      Jeffrey Starr, interview by author, January 30, 2018.
15      Interviews by author.
16      Robert J. Giesler (former chief of Strategy and Plans in the Strategic Capabilities Office,
Secretary of Defense and former director of Information Operations and Strategic Studies),
interview by author, February 15, 2018.
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can influence Putin. Theater security cooperation activities offer a
viable counterpropaganda platform. The military must also lead North
Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) cooperation important to other
global security efforts.
Interagency Fusion Cell. The minority staff of the Senate Committee
on Foreign Relations has advocated for a fusion cell, modeled on the
approach used by the National Counterterrorism Center, to counter
Russian influence operations.17 The most challenging aspect of this
approach involves relying exclusively on government expertise. The pace
and complexity of information warfare requires a wide range of outside
experts—many with unconventional skills—who can be hired on a solesource basis. Beebe cautions such cells establish another bureaucracy
as departments and agencies rarely “send their top-tier talent to these
teams. And once the representatives arrive, typically their priority is
to put the interests of their parent organization ahead of the fusion
cell.” 18 As Carlson adds, such task forces have previously “crashed and
crumbled on the sharp rocks of each agency’s distinct mission, budget,
congressional mandate, regulations, procedures, and self-image” with
little success in achieving their purpose.19
The intelligence community should support the team of teams.
But in contrast to the covert nature of intelligence activities, efforts of
the team of teams should be overt. Persuading the Kremlin to back
down requires transparency. The public needs to understand what
the Kremlin is doing. Putin needs to understand the consequences of
Kremlin actions. A team of teams can capitalize on the strengths of all
elements of national power to achieve its objectives and leverage the
power of the presidency to maximize them.

Employ Active Defense

The notion of active defense embraces many options. The team
of teams should focus on understanding foreign propaganda efforts,
recognizing the individual and organizational agents that influence
American interests, involving private industry in disseminating accurate
and transparent information, and improving legislative accoutrements
by increasing enforcement of established laws and expanding restrictions
on employing bots.

Understand Propaganda

The military’s cybercapability is ideal for identifying the
communication channels that are creating propaganda and for achieving
the reach, penetration, and impact of the narratives, themes, and
messages. Target audience analysis can identify what stories, narratives,
themes, and messages are circulating—and the language in which they are
articulated. The analysis can reveal how messages resonate with different
audiences through opinion research, such as focus groups and surveys,
and behavioral research that identifies how language affects audiences
intellectually and emotionally. Target audience analysis also integrates
17      Putin’s Asymmetric Assault on Democracy in Russia and Europe: Implications for U.S. National Security,
Prepared for the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, S. Prt. 115-21, 115th Cong 155 (January 10, 2018).
18      George Beebe, interview by author, February 10, 2018.
19      Carlson, interview.
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opinion research with intelligence sources and uses information gained
from grassroots and grasstops engagement.20 This information can
be shared with US audiences to help them understand the nature of
communications originating with parties promoting foreign interests.
Measures of attitudes and opinions gained from this information will
also allow the team of teams to forge winning narratives, themes, and
messages and to allocate resources. The military’s experience in target
audience analysis makes it the most appropriate leader for this effort.

Recognizing Agents

Most Americans lack awareness of the many media outlets, such as
RT and RIA Global LLC (Sputnik), that are linked to Russian intelligence.
English language shows—such as News with Ed Schulz, Larry King Now,
America’s Lawyer with Mike Papantonio, and Going Underground—and
the employment of American journalists provide foreign news outlets
with false legitimacy as independent news organizations.21 Can anyone
imagine the American journalist Edward R. Murrow selling his services
to German propagandist Joseph Goebbels like Larry King has to RT?
Walter Isaacson, former managing editor of Time and chief
executive officer of CNN, argues efforts to discourage individuals from
contributing to such propaganda must be pursued cautiously with a goal
of achieving resiliency: “I would not favor imposing official or legal
sanctions on American citizens working for such organizations, because
it could set a dangerous precedent that restricts free speech. . . . But if
someone is shilling for an organization you believe is harmful, you have
an absolute right to call them out for it, and I think that we should.” 22
The United States could, for example, prohibit business activity under
the Countering America’s Adversaries through Sanctions Act similar
to the Treasury Department and the Office of Foreign Assets Control
prohibitions against Iran and Libya.23 The team of teams can identify
the best approach for holding US citizens accountable for associations
that support and legitimize Russian propaganda while forging resilience.

Role of Industry

Industry groups should be discouraged from treating foreign
propaganda operations as legitimate organizations. For example, when
the International Academy of Television Arts and Sciences considers
RT for Emmy Awards in news and current affairs, the American people
might begin to associate the media channel communicating Russian
intelligence messages as a trustworthy source.24 By drawing upon
industry and legislative expertise, the team of teams could appropriately
20      James P. Farwell and Darby J. Arakelian, “Using Information in Contemporary War,” Parameters
46, no. 3 (Autumn 2016): 76–86. Political consultants refer to opinion leaders as “grasstops.”
21      “Shows,” RT, accessed April 26, 2018, https://www.rt.com/shows/.
22      Walter Isaacson, interview by author, February 26, 2018.
23      Countering America’s Adversaries through Sanctions Act, Pub. L. No. 115-44 (2017); “Iran
Sanctions,” US Department of the Treasury, April 16, 2018, https://www.treasury.gov/resource
-center/sanctions/Programs/Pages/iran.aspx; and “Libya Sanctions,” US Department of the
Treasury, March 6, 2018.
24      “RT Becomes First Ever Russian TV Channel To Get Emmy News Nomination,” RT,
January 1, 2000, https://www.rt.com/about-us/press-releases/rt-becomes-first-russian-tv-channel
-emmy-news-nomination/.
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develop sanctions that offer an actionable strategy and determine laws
or amendments to existing laws to achieve this goal.25

Improving Legislation

Enforcing current laws. The decision to require Sputnik International,
RT, and RIA Global LLC to register under the Foreign Agents
Registration Act, which covers agents “seeking economic or political
advantage for their clients,” was significant.26 The act covers “foreign
political parties, a person or organization outside the United States,
except U.S. citizens, and any entity organized under the laws of a
foreign country or having its principal place of business in a foreign
country.” 27 The statute excludes news or press agencies if ownership
is held by at least 80 percent US citizens and the organization is not
directed, supervised, controlled, subsidized, or financed by any foreign
principals. Using the Foreign Agents Registration Act for all sites
associated with foreign intelligence agencies would force Moscow to
label their “informational materials” with a conspicuous disclosure of
the agents acting for a foreign principal.28 Exposing this truth will help
discredit the manipulative communications.
Expanding restrictions. A study by Oxford University’s Samuel
C. Woolley and Philip N. Howard examined “the use of algorithms,
automation, and human curation to purposefully distribute misleading
information over social media networks,” in contexts such as the use of
bots during the 2016 US elections. Their research examined 17 million
tweets from 1,798,127 unique users and concluded “false news reports
. . . can in many cases be considered to be a form of computational
propaganda. Bots are often key tools in propelling this disinformation
across sites like Twitter, Facebook, Reddit, and beyond.” 29 The study
concluded that bots challenge the integrity of democratic political
processes because they “are easily programmable . . . can be deployed
by just about anyone with preliminary coding knowledge. . . . [and
can be used] to create an illusion of popularity around fringe issues or
political candidates.” 30
Some researchers have concluded bots are “capable of massively
distributing propaganda in social and online media” and can be “partly
responsible for recent election results.” 31 Bots enable operators to flood
voter perceptions with false or misleading assertions that can overwhelm
25      For one example of flawed legislation that could benefit from the team of teams, see the
Countering America’s Adversaries through Sanctions Act. Peter Baker and Sophia Kishkovsky,
“Trump Signs Russian Sanctions into Law, With Caveats,” New York Times, August 2, 2017.
26      Foreign Agents Registration Act of 1938, 22 U.S.C. §611 et seq (2011); Nathan Layne, “U.S.Based Russian News Outlet Registers as Foreign Agent,” Reuters, February 17, 2018, https://www
.reuters.com/article/us-usa-trump-russia-propaganda/u-s-based-russian-news-outlet-registers
-as-foreign-agent-idUSKCN1G201H; and “Criminal Resource Manual: 2062. Foreign Agents
Registration Act Enforcement,” Offices of the United States Attorneys, https://www.justice.gov
/usam/criminal-resource-manual-2062-foreign-agents-registration-act-enforcement.
27      “General FARA Frequently Asked Questions,” US Department of Justice, August 21, 2017,
https://www.fara.gov/fara-faq.html#1.
28      22 U.S.C. 611(d).
29      Samuel C. Woolley and Philip N. Howard, Computational Propaganda Worldwide: Executive
Summary, working paper 2017.11 (Oxford: University of Oxford, 2017), 3, 5, 8, 9.
30      Douglas Guilbeault and Samuel Woolley, “How Twitter Bots Are Shaping the Election,”
Atlantic, November 1, 2016.
31      Christian Grimme et al., “Social Bots: Human-like by Means of Human Control?,” Big Data
5, no. 4 (December 1, 2017): 279, doi:10.1089/big.2017.0044.
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the capacity of humans to respond. Aided by the coming era of artificial
intelligence, the dangers posed by bots are going to escalate. In The
Madcom Future, a highly recommended publication, Foreign Service
Officer Matt Chessen articulates the dangers of a dystopian social media
environment that this technology poses.32
The Constitution guarantees US citizens freedom of speech. But
that right does not extend to robots. In fact, algorithmic assessments and
automated messages generated through artificial intelligence, especially
when such “speech” influences elections, should not be protected. To
prevent the use of such technology from manipulating US citizens,
social media platforms should be required to authenticate whether a
human is not only responsible for managing each account but is also
communicating from it. The authenticity of human communications
becomes more important as the ability of artificial intelligence to create
artificial realities using avatars on social media platforms increases the
challenges of countering fake news and disinformation.

The Strategic Offensive

Offensive tactics and operations should be strategically layered
and executed, which requires military appreciation and leadership.
Persuading Putin to back down is Realpolitik that requires understanding
his perception of the strategic situation and his motivations. Many
commentators believe the Kremlin instigated the election meddling. But
the Russian experts interviewed for this article agreed with reports that
the Kremlin felt it merely responded to its perception of US aggression
such as the bombing of Belgrade in 1999, retaining Muammar Gadhafi
in Libya, and meddling in Russian elections.33 The experts agree Hillary
Clinton’s criticism of Putin infuriated him and served as a key motivator
for the Kremlin’s meddling in the US election of 2016.34
Realistically, offensive actions may best be aimed at establishing,
in Beebe’s words, a “rules of the road” by which all sides refrain from
meddling in election infrastructure in Russia, the United States, and
other Western nations.35 Establishing that framework will require
strategic military input as well as an evaluation of political and diplomatic
considerations. The task is daunting but doable. Strategy needs to be
thought through carefully and executed to account for Putin’s emotional,
unpredictable nature.

32      Matt Chessen, The Madcom Future: How Artificial Intelligence Will Enhance Computational
Propaganda, Reprogram Human Culture, and Threaten Democracy . . . And What Can Be Done about It,
(Washington, DC: Atlantic Council, 2017).
33      Evan Osnos, David Remnick, and Joshua Yaffa, “Trump, Putin and the Cold War,” New
Yorker, March 6, 2017; Arkady Ostrovsky, The Invention of Russia (New York: Penguin, 2015); Mikhail
Zygar, All the Kremlin’s Men: Inside the Court of Vladimir Putin (New York: PublicAffairs, 2016); Andreĭ
Soldatov and Irina Borogan, The Red Web: The Kremlin’s Wars on the Internet (New York: PublicAffairs,
2015); “Statement on Addition of NDI to Russian ‘Undesirable Organizations’ List,” NDI, March 10,
2016, https://www.ndi.org/Statement-Russian-Undesirable-Organizations-List; and “Russia Adds
International Republican Institute to Growing List of ‘Undesirable Organizations,’ ” International
Republican Institute, August 18, 2016, http://www.iri.org/resource/russia-adds-international
-republican-institute-growing-list-%E2%80%9Cundesirable-organizations%E2%80%9D.
34      Will Kirby, “ ‘Revenge’ Vladimir Putin ‘Interfered in the US Election To Get Back at Hillary
Clinton,’ ” Express (London), December 12, 2016; and Isikoff and Corn, Russian Roulette.
35      George Beebe, interview by author, March 23, 2018.
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Increase Political Pressure

The team of teams could coordinate a human factors analysis through
the Department of Defense to identify key state and state-proxy influentials whose agendas Putin spends much time balancing. By understanding the recipients of Putin’s selective repression and manipulation,
which includes arrests and feeding interpersonal animosity among Russia’s leaders, strategists can target individuals such as Dmitry Rogozin,
who was recently promoted from presiding over Russia’s growing militaryindustrial complex, and Yevgeny Prigozhin, dubbed “Putin’s Chef,” who
runs the indicted internet research company, to exert pressure.36 These
individuals and other influentials could add pressure for Putin to back
off US election interference.37 While this article refrains from itemizing
all the legal tools available to make the lives of influential Russian’s
difficult, plenty of options exist: assigning an unwanted label such as
“criminal” and conducting hours of Customs and Border Protection
questioning are but two inconvenient pressures. There are any number
of ways to make the daily lives of Russian dignitaries more difficult, and
irritate them to the point that they complain to Putin.
If more intense efforts become necessary, financial sanctions,
cybertools, and weaponized social media can also play havoc in their
personal lives. In this situation, Putin may find attending to the whining
influentials preferable to meddling in foreign elections.38 A less optimal
tactic involves imposing complete sanctions at a single stroke. Layered
tactics will enable the team of teams to develop an effective strategy
to gradually increase the pressure and clearly communicate the tactics
will stop when Putin does. Putin might not yield if the demand is to
change his policies on Ukraine; however, he may well prove responsive
to demands about our elections.

Apply Distractive Measures

In addition to creating a political environment that forces Putin
to focus his attention closer to home, the same types of weaponized
social and broadcast media employed against the United States can be
used to discredit and to delegitimize Putin’s leadership in Russia. That
strategy would also require him to respond to domestic issues. Russians
are aware of the concentration of wealth and power in their country. Yet
a 24/7 direct broadcast satellite news service could expose corruption,
nepotism, and incompetence that Russians already suspect. America’s
driving of that narrative will aggravate Putin.39
Putin lacks the total control once exerted by Joseph Stalin. He does
not control events. That renders his regime politically brittle. We could
use social and broadcast media to attack the history the Kremlin invokes
to justify its actions. That history includes the myth that World War II
was a patriotic war that united Russians and that it was won without
36      The United States has already instituted some sanctions against notable Russians.
“Общегражданский проект «Список Путина»” (The All-Citizens Project: Putin’s List),
Forum Free Russia, December 5, 2017, https://www.forumfreerussia.org/main/2017-12-05
/obshhegrazhdanskij-proekt-sostavlyaem-spisok-putina-2/.
37      Mikhail Zygar, All the Kremlin’s Men; and interviews with Mallory, Jensen, and Beebe.
38      Donald P. Jensen, interview by author, February 27, 2018.
39      King Mallory, interview by author, February 16, 2018.
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allied help.40 A reminder that Stalin sent returning prisoners of war to
labor camps, sponsored mass deportations of Chechens and others, and
acted as a despotic tyrant would challenge Russians’ perceptions of the
state. Changing fixed attitudes and beliefs that a target audience holds is
challenging. But Putin roots his policies in the myth, which he cannot
afford to lose.
These actions require military leadership to support the target
audience analysis, provide strategic appreciation, and develop the story,
narrative, theme, and message. Given Putin’s tendency toward emotional
and unpredictable reactions, clear communications to the Kremlin about
what and why actions are being taken must be conveyed by credible
communicators to avert avoidable escalation. The military can also
conduct beneficial military-to-military back-channel communications
with the Kremlin, which provides another reason for a servicemember
to be the public face of the team of teams.

Employ Cybertools

The capability to use cybertools against critical infrastructure offers
strategic and tactic opportunities. The Washington Post reported Obama
“authorized planting cyberweapons in Russia’s infrastructure, the digital
equivalent of bombs that could be detonated if the United States found
itself in an escalating exchange with Moscow.” 41 Reportedly, he left
the decision on whether to use the capability to President Trump. The
complex nature of this decision, as well as the magnitude of intended and
unintended consequences arising from employing malware, mandate the
president seek expert advice on potential scenarios and effects before
approving cyberaction.
A properly configured team of teams would possess this expertise.
The knowledge would enable the team to understand the intricacies
associated with precise targeting and to address relevant concepts.
Some experts on the team will recognize the intended and unintended
political consequences of using cybertools. The team must use this
information to guide the team’s development of clear explanations
and recommendations for the National Security Council and the
president. Experts involved with Stuxnet, for example, could explain the
importance of differentiating “between the propagator, or boost-phase
code that disseminates the program, and the actual payload code that
creates the physical effect on a target (the distinction between the gift
wrapping and the gift)” to protect the global network while affecting the
intended target.42
The broad perspective developed by the team of teams can limit
situations identified by Herbert Lin in which factors such as “poorly
designed malware and inadequate intelligence can cause unintended
collateral damage.” Incidents occurring because of these factors may
appear “deliberate rather than accidental . . . thereby setting the stage
for escalation.” Lin explains, “Using cybertools to retaliate against
Russian interference in our political process may be appropriate and
40      Donald P. Jensen, interview by author, February 23, 2018.
41      Greg Miller, Ellen Nakashima, and Adam Entous, “Obama’s Secret Struggle to Punish Russia
for Putin’s Election Assault,” Washington Post, June 23, 2017; and Isikoff and Corn, Russian Roulette.
42      James P. Farwell and Rafal Rohozinski, “The New Reality of Cyber War,” Survival 54, no. 4
(August-September 2012): 108, doi:10.1080/00396338.2012.709391.
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useful, but only if the United States is willing and able to tolerate a
Russian counterresponse.” 43 One tactic that merits close consideration
is neutralizing known Russian bots that interfere in our elections such
as those used by the Internet Research Agency.

Stabilize International Relations

Putin has staked his leadership credibility on his actions in Ukraine,
which creates a strategic pressure point. Competing schools of thought
argue how best to exploit this potential. Experts such as Jensen believe
Russia will never accept Ukrainian neutrality between Russia and
the West; they argue for bolstering Ukrainian security and economic
resilience. Experts such as Beebe are more optimistic about stabilizing
these relationships and foresee a neutrality agreement that excludes the
possibility of Ukraine joining NATO.
The strategy debate for Ukraine lies in another venue. Yet the pressure
point of Ukrainian-Russian relations should be leveraged. Furthermore,
the strategy should also include locating a military information support
operations team in our embassy in Kiev.

Conclusion

Nikki Halley, US ambassador to the United Nations, has characterized Russia’s meddling as “warfare.” 44 The White House possesses the
clout to counter Russia’s disinformation activity. Employing a teamof-teams approach will improve the president’s understanding of the
available options. Tough decisions may be necessary—for example,
altering voter rolls or election outcomes may justify attacking Russian
critical infrastructure. Such action mandates communicating the
consequences to the Kremlin clearly, privately, and precedently.45
America’s communication during information and cyber warfare
must build and maintain trust in the truth, articulate a credible rationale
for the necessary action, and claim the moral high ground for it. The
credibility of the US military argues for using it as the face of national
security matters. Working with a team of teams, military contacts with the
Russian military will enable constructive engagement to avert avoidable
or accidental escalation. The military’s expertise in psychological and
influential operations, cybertools, electronic warfare, and assessing
Russian capabilities and intentions align with the pivotal role for forcing
the Kremlin to stop meddling in US election processes.
An empowered team of teams can forge and execute active defense
to discredit and to delegitimize Russian action in the United States. The
team can compel Putin to shift his focus away from US politics to his
affairs at home. But we need to take action before the escalation cycle
becomes irreversible.

43      Herbert Lin, interview by the author, February 19, 2018.
44      Maegan Vazquez, “Nikki Haley: Russian Cyberinterference into US Elections Is ‘Warfare,’ ”
CNN, October 19, 2017, https://www.cnn.com/2017/10/19/politics/nikki-haley-russia-warfare
/index.html.
45      Annabelle Dickson and Laurens Cerulus, “British Cyber Option to Punish Russia Prompts
Fear of ‘Electronic War,’ ” Politico, March 13, 2018.

